



UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL LA 3266 GG (HIN EKHB4665D909) LOSS OF LIFE IN THE VERMILION BAY ON JULY 11, 2023



MISLE ACTIVITY NUMBER: 7756996

U.S. Department of
Homeland Security

United States
Coast Guard



Commandant
United States Coast Guard

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16732/IIA #7756996
29 July 2025

FALL OVERBOARD AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF ONE LIFE FROM THE COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL LA 3266 GG IN THE VICINITY OF BAYOU HEBERT IN VERMILION PARISH, LOUISIANA ON JULY 11, 2023

ACTION BY THE COMMANDANT

The record and the report of the investigation completed for the subject casualty have been reviewed. The record and the report, including the findings of fact, analysis, conclusions, and recommendation, are approved subject to the following comments. This marine casualty investigation is closed.

ACTION ON RECOMMENDATION

Recommendation 1: Recommend Commandant evaluate mandatory use of wireless engine cut-off switches (ECOS) for offshore commercial fishing vessels (CFV). This recommendation specifically targets vessels with solitary operators, where the nature of their activities necessitates the engagement of propulsion engines while operating over the side and away from the operating station.

Action: I concur with the intent of the recommendation. While the United States Coast Guard (USCG) agrees that the identified safety hazard requires remediation, it does not agree with the proposed corrective action. An ECOS, appropriate for commercial fishing operations, can greatly enhance the underway safety of solitary vessel operators. Wireless ECOS systems have the potential to save lives without the same hindrances presented by a tethered ECOS system. In general, a wireless, non-tethered engine cutoff switch is cordless, and displays safeguard features that enable the engine cutoff when the mariner becomes separated from the vessel.

The Report of Investigation indicated several causal factors that likely contributed to the mariner's fatality, such as testing positive for marijuana metabolites, not wearing a life jacket, conducting crab pot operations with an injured leg, working long hours in temperatures up to 90 degrees Fahrenheit, and conducting solo open-hull offshore operations in a moderate sea state. The owner's decisions in this case created a high-risk situation that ultimately contributed to the incident and his subsequent drowning. Though wireless ECOS systems can mitigate the risks associated with a runaway boat, sound decisions and situational awareness play a key role when operating in hazardous environments. As such, this incident may not have been prevented by a wireless ECOS


29 July 2025

system. Therefore, I do not believe this incident and the investigative findings make a compelling case to require that an ECOS be equipped on every offshore CFV.

However, the USCG does recognize the value a wireless ECOS can have to improve safety and survivability, especially for solitary commercial fishing operations. As an enhanced safety measure, the USCG will recommend that solitary commercial fishing operators consider an ECOS that suits the type and function of their vessel for underway operations. Additionally, the USCG will remind CFV owners and operators that ECOS systems should be compliant with applicable technical standards such as the American Boat & Yacht Council Standard A-33 or other relevant marine industry safety standards. The USCG will also emphasize that mariners should thoroughly understand the features, functional capabilities, and the manufacturer technical information of any ECOS they may choose to adopt.

The Office of Commercial Vessel Compliance will incorporate ECOS guidance encouraging the voluntary use of wireless ECOS systems in the 2025 update to the *Commercial Fishing Industry Vessels Best Safety Practices Guide*. The update will specifically highlight the value wireless ECOS systems may have with solitary vessel operators by enhancing safety.

The USCG *Commercial Fishing Industry Vessels Best Safety Practices Guide* can be accessed at: [Commercial Fishing Industry Vessels Best Safety Practices Guide](#).



R. C. COMPHER
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Director of Inspections & Compliance (CG-5PC)



16732

**COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL LA 3266 GG (HIN EKHB4665D909) LOSS OF LIFE
IN THE VERMILION BAY ON JULY 11, 2023**

**ENDORSEMENT BY THE COMMANDER,
EIGHTH COAST GUARD DISTRICT**

The record and the report of the investigation convened for the subject casualty have been reviewed. The record and the report, including the findings of fact, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are approved. It is recommended that this marine casualty investigation be closed.

COMMENTS ON THE REPORT

1. The loss of the fisherman was a tragic and preventable accident. I offer my sincere condolences to the family and friends of the fisherman who lost his life.
2. The investigation and report contain valuable information which can be used to address the factors that contributed to this marine casualty and prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future.

ENDORSEMENT ON RECOMMENDATIONS

Safety Recommendation 1: Recommend Commandant evaluate mandatory use of a wireless ECOS (Engine Cut-Off Switch) for offshore commercial fishing vessels. This recommendation specifically targets vessels with solitary operators, where the nature of their activities necessitates the engagement of propulsion engines while operating over the side and away from the operating station.

Endorsement 1: I concur with the intent of this recommendation. The implementation of a wireless ECOS on offshore commercial fishing vessels has the potential to prevent injuries to fishermen and significantly improve incident outcomes. However, it is critical to raise awareness through educational outreach by federal and state partners during voluntary dockside examinations to inform commercial fishermen of the benefits of using a wireless ECOS. It is important to note that safety regulations outlined in 46 CFR Part 28 are voluntary for commercial fishing vessels operating within three nautical miles from the baseline, an area where most crabbing operations occur within this small sector of the

fishery. This underscores the need for continued outreach and education on the matter. The training should focus particularly on "one-person" commercial fishing operations, particularly small open-hull CFVs, where a single operator is both navigating the vessel and recovering traps. Such operations present significant hazards, as the operator may become distracted or complacent, increasing the risk of accidents. Additionally, factors such as low gunnels, slippery decks, and vessel pitching or rolling have contributed to overboard incidents when recovering gear. With advancements in technology, untethered cutoff switches for outboard engines now provide operators with greater freedom of movement in nearshore and inshore fisheries, thus enhancing safety. These scenarios should be addressed through targeted outreach and education.

Action: D8 CFVS Coordinator will work with fishing vessel examiners across the district to ensure that our examiners are educating one person fishing vessel operators that are a part of the commercial fishing fleet about of the risks associated with fishing alone and the benefits of using ECOS.



J. E. FOTHERGILL
Commander, U.S. Coast Guard
Chief of Prevention, Acting
Eighth Coast Guard District
By Direction



16732
February 15, 2024

**COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL LA 3266 GG
(HIN EKHB4665D909) LOSS OF LIFE IN THE
VERMILION BAY ON JULY 11, 2023**

ENDORSEMENT BY THE OFFICER IN CHARGE, MARINE INSPECTION

The record and the report of the investigation convened for the subject casualty have been reviewed. The record and the report, including the findings of fact, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are approved subject to the following comments. It is recommended that this marine casualty investigation be closed.

Safety Recommendation. Recommend Commandant evaluate mandatory use of a wireless ECOS (Engine Cut-Off Switch) for offshore commercial fishing vessels. This recommendation specifically targets vessels with solitary operators, where the nature of their activities necessitates the engagement of propulsion engines while operating over the side and away from the operating station.

Endorsement: Concur with intent– The presence of a ECOS during this incident could have made all the difference in protecting this mariner's life when he fell overboard. While wireless ECOS technology exists for outboard engines, as was present in this incident, a significant portion of single operator commercial fishing vessels have inboard engines in which similar ECOS technology is not commercially available. Recommend Commandant partner with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Commercial Fishing Safety division to conduct analysis of available technologies and/or develop the technology needed to adapt commercially available remote engine cut-off switches to both in-board and outboard powered vessels for further use in determining the feasibility in implementing a regulatory change requiring the use of an ECOS on commercial fishing vessels.

Administrative Recommendation: Recommend this investigation be closed.

Endorsement: Concur – recommend this investigation be closed.



L. T. O'BRIEN
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection
Houma, Louisiana



16732
February 6, 2024

COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL LA 3266 GG (HIN EKHB4665D909) LOSS OF LIFE IN THE VERMILION BAY ON JULY 11, 2023

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On July 11, 2023, during the morning hours, the state-registered vessel LA 3266 GG was launched upon the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway located in Intracoastal City, LA to go crabbing in the Vermilion Bay. At approximately 2115 hours, after not hearing back from the owner onboard, the owner's loved ones became worried and they called the local sheriff's office. Shortly after, the Vermilion Parish Sheriff's Office (VPSO) and Louisiana Department of Fish and Wildlife (LDFW) responded and began searching for the owner at his last known location in the Vermilion Bay.

On July 12, 2023, a friend of the owner helping locate the vessel noticed the owner's boat unoccupied, pushed up in the marsh with the motor running and the outboard engine hard to starboard. The VPSO and LDFW were notified and the LDWF towed the vessel back to where the owner's truck and trailer were located.

On July 13, 2023, a spotter plane identified a body in the marsh in vicinity of Bayou Herbert located on the north side of Vermilion Bay. Later that morning, VPSO and LDFW recovered the body and confirmed it was the owner. During recovery, lacerations to the right side of the owner's head and neck were observed. The owner was pronounced deceased by the medical examiner at approximately 1134 hours on July 13, 2023.

As a result of its investigation, the Coast Guard determined that the initiating event for this casualty was the owner falling overboard from the vessel LA 3266 GG. Subsequent events include the serious injury to the owner after being struck by the moving propeller, and death due to drowning. Causal factors contributing to this casualty were: 1) The owner's previous injury, 2) Unsafe sea state conditions for vessel, 3) Owner's fatigued condition, 4) Vessel's low gunwale height for owner's height, 5) Improper footwear, 6) Failure to wear the engine cut-off switch, 7) Failure to wear a lifejacket, 8) Operating a commercial fishing vessel alone offshore, and 9) Positive drug test result for owner.



16732
February 6, 2024

COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL LA 3266 GG (HIN EKHB4665D909) LOSS OF LIFE IN THE VERMILION BAY ON JULY 11, 2023

INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

1. Preliminary Statement

1.1. This marine casualty investigation was conducted, and this report was submitted in accordance with Title 46, Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), Subpart 4.07, and under the authority of Title 46, United States Code (U.S.C.), Chapter 63.

1.2. No individuals, organizations, or parties were designated as a party-in-interest in accordance with 46 C.F.R. § 4.03-10.

1.3. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) was the lead agency for all evidence collection activities in this investigation. The Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) conducted a preliminary investigation, and the owner was recovered by the Vermilion Parish Sheriff's Office (VPSO). An autopsy of the deceased owner was performed at the Parish Forensics by a forensic pathologist, and toxicology analysis was performed by NMS Labs.

1.4. All times listed in this report are approximate and are in Central Daylight Time using a 24-hour format.

2. Vessels Involved in the Incident



Figure 1 Commercial Fishing Vessel LA 3266 GG taken by the USCG July 12, 2023

Official Name:	LA 3266 GG
Hull Identification Number:	EKHB4665D909
Flag:	United States of America
Vessel Class/Type/Sub-Type	Commercial Fishing
Build Year:	2009
Gross Tonnage:	N/A
Length:	20' 10"
Beam/Width:	N/A
Draft/Depth:	N/A
Main/Primary Propulsion: (Configuration/System Type, Ahead Horsepower)	Outboard Gasoline: Yamaha 150 HP
Owner/Operator:	Matthew M. Montz Maurice, LA, USA

3. Deceased, Missing, and/or Injured Persons

Relationship to Vessel	Sex	Age	Status
Owner	Male	53	Deceased

4. Findings of Fact

4.1. The Incident:

4.1.1. On July 11, 2023, at approximately 0958 hours, the owner parked his vehicle at the Intracoastal City RV Lot and Dock located in Abbeville, LA and launched his vessel out of the Vermilion River to go crabbing and wash his crab pots in the Vermilion Bay.

4.1.2. On July 11, 2023, at 1340 hours, the owner made a phone call to a friend while offshore crabbing. This was the last known person to hear from the owner.

4.1.3. On July 11, 2023, at 1700 hours, the owner's wife attempted to make contact via cellular phone because he was supposed to be home by this time, but he did not pick up.

4.1.4. On July 11, 2023, at 2100 hours, the owner's spouse arrived at the boat launch site and noticed the owner's truck and boat trailer in the parking lot. Shortly after, the spouse contacted the VPSO to report the overdue fisherman.

4.1.5. On July 11, 2023, at about 2130 hours, the VPSO launched their vessel to conduct search and rescue operations to locate the owner in the Vermilion Bay.

4.1.6. On July 11, 2023, at 2336 hours, the LDWF deployed their vessel to assist in search and rescue operations.

4.1.7. On July 12, 2023, at about 0550, Coast Guard waterside and air assets arrived on scene to assist in search and rescue operations.

4.1.8. On July 12, 2023, at 0735 hours, a friend who was in the Vermilion Bay seeking to

locate the owner, discovered the vessel LA 3266 GG unoccupied and with its engine running in forward gear with the steering turned to starboard. The vessel was stationary in the marsh area located on the East side of the Vermilion Bay on Shark Island, opposite side of the launch site. When the vessel was discovered, the Engine Cut-off Switch (ECOS) was wrapped around the throttle, the pressure washer was in the on position, the boat hook used to assist retrieving crab pots was missing, and one worn down sandal (Croc) was located on the back deck area, the other sandal was missing.

4.1.9. On July 12, 2023, at 0745 hours, the friend contacted local authorities and the LDWF and VPSO arrived on scene and towed the vessel back to the original launch site.

4.1.10. On July 12, 2023, at 1058 hours, the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Detachment (MSD) Lafayette office was notified by the LDWF once they discovered that the owner was operating in a commercial fishing capacity. Upon this notification, the MSD Lafayette Investigations Division became the lead investigators for this casualty.

4.1.11. On July 12, 2023, search and rescue operations continued throughout the day and the following morning.

4.1.12. On July 13, 2023, at 1015 hours, a fixed wing spotter plane located a body on the northern area of the Vermilion Bay pushed up in the marsh.

4.1.13. On July 13, 2023, at 1035 hours, LDWF and VPSO arrived on-scene and identified the body as the owner. When his body was recovered, the owner was not wearing a personal flotation device. The owner had severe lacerations on the right side of his head and neck from the vessel's propeller.

4.1.14. On July 13, 2023, at 1134 hours, the Vermilion Parish Coroner arrived on scene and pronounced the owner deceased. The body was transported to the Vermilion Parish Coroner's Office.

4.1.15. On July 14, 2023, at 1300 hours, the Parish Forensics coroner conducted an autopsy on the owner. The cause of death was reported as accidental drowning. Drug and alcohol testing was performed during the autopsy.

4.2. Additional/Supporting Information:

4.2.1. The owner was a 6'0", 230lb, 53-year-old male in good physical condition and considered a good swimmer by friends and family.

4.2.2. The vessel was a 21-foot flat bottom Carolina Skiff with a 24" gunwale. The gunwale is considered low compared to rail height standards and would put the top of the gunwale just above the knee of the owner, increasing the potential of falling over the side.

4.2.3. On July 11, 2023, on-scene weather conditions were winds from the south/southwest at 15-23 knots with seas between 3 and 4 feet. The highest air temperature was 90° F. The subject flat bottom vessel was not designed to be operated in seas this high and this type of hull shape operates poorly in these environments.

4.2.4. The owners last phone call with a friend discussed him needing a break due to fatigue from the rough seas.

4.2.5. Crabbing operations on this type of vessel platform are typically conducted by leaning over the side with a boat hook to grab a line connecting a buoy to a crab pot/trap on the seabed. These lines are then attached around an electric winch installed on the rail of the vessel to assist with pulling up the trap.

4.2.6. As required by law, crab pot owners must pressure wash their traps every so often to remove barnacles and sea life accumulation. The owner was engaged in pressure washing his crab pots on this day. This type of operation can create a wet working environment on the back deck area where he was working and suspected of falling over at.

4.2.7. When operating offshore alone, crabbers will typically leave the helm area with the throttle engaged and rudder turned to port or starboard. They will then work over the side of the vessel to retrieve pots while the vessel is in motion. This significantly reduces a person's ability to get back onboard if falling over. This is also exacerbated by not wearing an engine cut-off switch preventing the propeller from stopping, which in this case, was found wrapped around the throttle and not attached to the owner.

4.2.8. Chemical testing was performed during the autopsy with blood drawn from the chest. The toxicology report identified a positive test for the presence of alcohol with a BAC result .078 g/100 ml. The forensic pathologist reported it could not be determined if the owner was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident as alcohol levels become artificially inflated at postmortem testing from the putrefaction of the body over the two-day period before the body was recovered.

4.2.9. The toxicology report identified a positive test for the presence of Delta-9 Tetrahydrocannabinols (THC) with a result of 30 ng/ml.

5. Analysis

5.1. Owner's previous injury. The owner had recently been diagnosed with a torn meniscus. This injury likely reduced the strength of the owner's leg and impaired his ability to maintain or regain his balance while conducting crabbing operations. It is reasonable to assume that had the owner been operating without an injured leg, he could have avoided falling overboard by staying balanced or regaining his balance in heavy seas.

5.2. Unsafe sea state conditions for vessel. A flat bottom 21-foot skiff operates poorly in sea states greater than 1 foot. The sea state on the day of the incident was 3 to 4 foot swells which may have created an unstable operating condition onboard and may have increased the level of effort for the owner to maintain his balance. Had the sea state been more suitable to the owner's vessel, it is reasonable to assume that the vessel could have been more stable for the operating conditions therefore preventing him from falling overboard.

5.3. Owner's fatigued condition. The owner was fatigued to the extent he required a break and discussed it with his friend over the phone. The owner had been preparing for and

conducting crabbing operations since early morning on the day of the incident. Additionally, air temperature on the day of the incident was above 90 degrees Fahrenheit. Working in temperatures above 90 degrees Fahrenheit, particularly during strenuous activity, poses health risks like heat-related illnesses, dehydration, fatigue, dizziness, and an elevated heart rate. Fatigue induces physical exhaustion, resulting in reduced muscle strength, coordination, and overall physical performance. It is reasonable to assume that had the owner not been in a fatigued state, he could have better responded to his working conditions and reduced the potential of falling overboard.

5.4. Vessel's low gunwale, owner's height. The owner was 6 feet tall, and the vessel had a gunwale height of 24 inches around the owner's working area. Considering this, the top of the rail was in the vicinity of his knee, creating an unsafe condition for him to work in, especially in rough sea state conditions, where the risk of falling overboard was increased. Although not applicable to the owner's type of vessel, the minimum rail height for certain uninspected similar size fishing vessels is 39.5 inches. Had a higher gunwale height been installed on this vessel, the likelihood of the owner falling overboard would have been significantly reduced.

5.5. Improper footwear. The owner was wearing Crocs sandals with worn-down soles instead of boots commonly worn by fishermen in the industry. While Crocs shoes are popular for their comfort and breathability, they present safety concerns due to their open-toe design, lack of foot protection, slippery soles that may contribute to slips and falls, minimal ankle support, absence of secure fastening leading to potential shoe loss in water, and the risk of debris entering through the shoe's openings. Had the owner been using adequate shoes for the activity at hand and the wet and slippery environment he was working in, it is reasonable to assume that the risk of slips, trips, and falls could have been reduced; hence, preventing him from falling overboard.

5.6. Failure to wear the engine cut-off switch. The owner was not wearing the engine cut-off switch installed on the vessel at the time of the casualty, resulting in the engine continuing to run clutched in when he fell overboard. Consequently, the owner was struck by the vessel's moving propeller while in the water. The engine cut-off switch on a vessel serves as a safety mechanism to stop the vessel's engine if the operator unexpectedly falls overboard. Typically worn as a lanyard attached to the boat operator, the engine cut-off switch automatically stops the engine if the operator moves too far away from the controls, helping prevent incidents where the vessel continues to operate without an operator. This safety feature is crucial for minimizing the risk of injuries or accidents, especially in situations where the operator loses control or falls into the water. Moreover, on April 1, 2021, a law was implemented requiring operators of certain recreational vessels less than 26 feet long to utilize an engine cut-off switch. However, this requirement did not apply to the owner of the vessel LA 3266 GG because he was engaged in commercial fishing operations at the time of the casualty. Additionally, the requirement to use the engine cut-off switch applies when the vessel is operating on plane or above displacement speed. The vessel engine was clutched in ahead at idle speed but not on plane at the time of the casualty. Therefore, even if the law would have been implemented prior to the casualty, it would not have applied to the owner. Had the owner been wearing the installed engine cut-off switch at the time he fell overboard, it is reasonable to believe that the engine would have been stopped as he fell, and he would not have been struck by the moving propeller.

5.7. Failure to wear a lifejacket. The owner was not wearing a lifejacket at the time of the incident despite having a Type I lifejacket onboard the vessel. Although not required by law to

be worn by commercial fishermen, lifejackets provide buoyancy, ensuring that individuals stay afloat in case of accidental falls overboard or emergencies. In unpredictable conditions, such as sudden weather changes, vessel malfunctions, or slips overboard, lifejackets can be lifesaving, preventing drowning and offering crucial support until help arrives. Additionally, Type I lifejackets offer the highest level of buoyancy among all lifejacket types. This design provides a minimum buoyancy of 22 pounds for adults, making it suitable for offshore activities and rough waters. The key benefit is its ability to turn an unconscious person face-up in the water, ensuring airway clearance and reducing the risk of drowning. Had the vessel owner been wearing the Type 1 lifejacket onboard, it is reasonable to assume that the lifejacket could have provided sufficient buoyancy to prevent him from drowning and potentially from being struck by the moving propeller.

5.8. Operating a commercial fishing vessel alone offshore. The owner was operating the fishing vessel by himself. Operating a fishing vessel alone poses significant hazards, including limited assistance in case of emergencies, heightened fatigue due to sole responsibility, challenges in maneuvering while retrieving catch, vulnerability to medical issues without immediate aid, and susceptibility to adverse weather conditions. In a commercial fishing vessel operation, having another person onboard to assist with controlling the vessel at the helm position allows the other person to maneuver the vessel safely. If a second person had been onboard with the owner, they could have assisted the owner and prevented the vessel's propeller from striking the owner.

5.9. Positive drug test result. During the autopsy report, chemical testing for the owner was conducted and produced a non-negative test result of 30 ng/ml for Delta-9 THC, the active ingredient in marijuana. In a National Institute of Justice funded study published in 2021, researchers concluded that biofluid samples were not reliable indicators of marijuana intoxication. The variable nature of a person's metabolism and the unknown frequency of owner's marijuana use prevent the determination of whether he was intoxicated and impaired at the time of the incident. The positive test result does indicate the ingestion of marijuana, but it is unclear as to what time and date the ingestion took place. Therefore, the owner's use of marijuana cannot be ruled out as a causal factor because it is possible that there was some level of impairment from marijuana consumption.

6. Conclusions

6.1. Determination of Cause:

6.1.1. The initiating event for this casualty occurred when the owner fell overboard from the LA 3266 GG while crabbing solo in Vermilion Bay. Casual factors leading to this event were:

6.1.1.1. The owner's prior leg injury affecting his strength and balance.

6.1.1.2. The unsafe sea-state conditions creating an unstable platform for the owner to work on.

6.1.1.3. The owner's fatigued state impacting his ability to respond to the working conditions and properly adjust to them.

6.1.1.4. The low gunwale height of the vessel increasing the risk of falling overboard.

6.1.1.5. The inadequate footwear worn by the owner that was prone to slipping and falling on wet surfaces.

6.1.1.6. Possible impairment of owner due to previous consumption of marijuana.

6.1.2. The owner falling overboard resulted in the next event, which was the owner suffering serious injury to his head and neck from being struck by the moving propeller and eventually drowning. Casual factors that contributed to this event were:

6.1.2.1. Failure of the owner to wear the vessel's engine cut-off switch preventing the vessel's engine and propeller to shut down when he fell overboard.

6.1.2.2. Failure of the owner to wear a lifejacket contributing to him not staying face side up if unconscious and assisting him with buoyancy.

6.1.2.3. Fishing alone in a hazardous operating environment leading to no assistance during emergencies.

6.2. Evidence of Act(s) or Violation(s) of Law by Any Coast Guard Credentialed Mariner Subject to Action Under 46 USC Chapter 77: This investigation did not identify acts or violations by any Coast Guard Credentialed Mariner subject to Suspension and Revocation.

6.3. Evidence of Act(s) or Violation(s) of Law by U.S. Coast Guard Personnel, or any other person: This investigation did not identify incompetence, negligence, unskillfulness, or violations of law by U. S. Coast Guard employees that contributed to this casualty.

6.4. Evidence of Act(s) Subject to Civil Penalty: This investigation did not identify violations of any laws subject to civil penalty.

6.5. Evidence of Criminal Act(s): This investigation did not identify violations of criminal law.

6.6. Need for New or Amended U.S. Law or Regulation: This investigation did not identify matters needing new or amended U.S. law or regulation not addressed in the safety recommendation.

6.7. Unsafe Actions or Conditions that Were Not Causal Factors: This investigation did not identify any unsafe actions or conditions that were not casual factors.

7. Actions Taken Since the Incident

7.1. No actions have been taken since the incident.

8. Recommendations

8.1. Safety Recommendation:

8.1.1. Recommend Commandant evaluate mandatory use of a wireless ECOS (Engine Cut-Off Switch) for offshore commercial fishing vessels. This recommendation specifically targets vessels with solitary operators, where the nature of their activities necessitates the engagement of propulsion engines while operating over the side and away from the operating station.

8.2. Administrative Recommendations:

8.2.1. Recommend this investigation be closed.



CWO3, U.S. Coast Guard
Investigating Officer